This paper estimates a monetary policy reaction function for the ECB over the period [1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009]. To model the shift of the reaction function during the financial crisis, we allow for a smooth transition from one set of parameters to another. The estimates show a swift change in the months following the collapse of Lehmann brothers. Under the new regime, the ECB cuts rates more aggressively than before, consistent with the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in the vicinity of the zero bound.
Introduction
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, central banks across the world initiated a series of large interest rates cuts. Two related factors may have placed a role in this episode. Most obviously, the sharp falls in headline inflation and economic activity warranted a correspondingly strong policy response to support growth and to ensure that inflation would return to the desired level. Furthermore, and more interestingly, the possibility that policy rates may eventually reach the zero lower bound (ZLB) may have led central banks to alter their interest rate setting behaviour.
Whether and how monetary policy should change in the run-up to the ZLB has been the subject of intense debate. On the one hand, some have argued that the prospect of reaching the ZLB calls for central banks to "keep their gun powder dry" and be more cautious in cutting rates. On the other hand, the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy argues that interest rates in this case should be cut faster and more aggressively than otherwise.
The recent experiences therefore provide an opportunity to test whether the predictions of the existing theoretical literature are consistent with observed interest rate setting behaviour in the vicinity of the lower bound. In this paper we seek to perform such a test, focussing on the rate setting of the ECB in the period 1999-2009, that is, before and during the current financial crisis.
We estimate a reaction function for the ECB using a smooth transition methodology that allows for a gradual shift between regimes. This enables us to estimate whether and, if so, when and how rapidly a shift in reaction function occurred.
We begin by estimating the switch as a function of time and find strong evidence for such a change in the autumn of 2008 which occurred gradually over a period of several months. Testing against the nested alternatives of a discrete break in October 2008 or no change at all, we find that a smooth transition model fits the data significantly better. We then extend this analysis and allow the transition between regimes to depend on real GDP growth rather than time. This approach gives an economic explanation for the switch, and unlike the case in which the switch is modelled as a deterministic function of time allows for the switch to be reversed. As one would expect, this model fits the data less well, but the worsening of fit is trivial and the estimated timing and speed of the transition is very similar to that of the first model. The switch is estimated to have occurred when the annual growth rate of real GDP fell to -1.4% and is again consistent with a gradual switch during the autumn of
2008.
In both cases, the results indicate that ECB behaviour was consistent with the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy near the ZLB. We find robust evidence that after the autumn of 2008, interest rates were cut faster and more aggressively than the regular reaction function would have predicted.
The paper contributes to two distinct strands of the literature. First and foremost, we provide an empirical exploration of the main implication of theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in the vicinity of the zero bound. Secondly, we update the existing empirical literature on ECB interest rate setting behaviour to include an analysis of the crisis period.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literatures on monetary policy in the presence of the ZLB and the estimation of reaction functions for the ECB. We also provide a short overview of ECB interest rate setting during the crisis. In Section 3 we outline our estimation strategy, explain our choice of data and discuss how we model the structural change in the reaction function. Section 4 presents the results of our estimations. Finally, Section 5 offers some tentative conclusions.
Preliminaries
As a prelude to the subsequent discussion, in this section we briefly review the relevant literature on the ZLB, provide a short review of the literature estimation reaction functions for the ECB, and review ECB interest rate decisions from July 2007
onwards, that is, the month before the financial crisis started with a tightening of liquidity in interbank markets worldwide.
The ZLB
Central banks are unable to reduce interest rates (much) below zero since agents can avoid negative nominal interest rates by holding money rather than interest bearing assets. 1 This places an effective floor of zero on interest rates. Although this issue has been noted as far back as Keynes (1936) and Fischer (1896), it was first emphasised in the modern literature by Summers (1991 argued that even if short-term interest rates are stuck at zero, a massive expansion of the monetary base is likely to raise aggregate demand, for instance via the prices of financial assets, in particular on the prices of longer-term bonds. 5 The possibility of depreciating the exchange rate to raise inflation expectations and reduce real interest rates has also received much attention. 6 The importance of non-monetary policies, in particular fiscal policy, has also been noted. But while this literature has generally concluded that monetary and fiscal policy could be used to expand aggregate demand at the zero bound, there is great uncertainty about the effectiveness of these policies. Furthermore, at the time those papers were written, the only recent episode observed instance of a bank facing the ZLB was that of the Bank of Japan, which did not instil confidence in the efficacy of such alternative measures.
In light of this, the third issue addressed is how interest rate policy should be conducted in a situation in which the central bank anticipates that the ZLB might become binding. To clarify the argument, consider the stylised representation in 3
References. 44 For a discussion of the consequences of the ZLB for monetary policy, see Gerlach et al. (2009). 5 See Orphanides and Wieland (2000) . 6 See, for instance, Svensson (2001) or Wieland (2003, 2004) . Figure 1 . In the absence of a non-negativity constraint on the policy rate, the unconstrained optimal policy rate depends on the state of the macro economy and is denoted by i*. The best the central bank can do is to set the actual interest rate, i, equal to i* at all points in time.
Suppose next that a severe downturn occurs and that the central bank predicts, i* to fall below zero as the economy weakens. Faced with the prospect of i* reaching 0 in the future, there are essentially three strategies a central bank can follow.
The first option is to simply follow their current reaction function until the recommended policy rate reaches zero, and then hold rates at zero for as long i* is negative.
The central bank's second option is to cut interest rates aggressively to zero once it becomes clear that the ZLB may be reached. In that case the interest rate will follow the dashed line in Figure 1 . Thus, as the likelihood the ZLB will bind rises, the central bank cuts interest rates below i* before it reaches zero. This strategy is line with the recommendations of the literature on optimal monetary policy with a zero bound. Reifschneider and Williams (2000) consider a situation in which monetary policy affects aggregate demand through the long interest rate. If i* falls below zero, the actual policy rate will exceed the optimal rate, implying that long interest rates will be too high. To counteract this effect, they argue that the central bank should set rates below i* prior to the ZLB being reached (and perhaps maintain them at this level for a while even if i* rises above zero). Adam and Billi (2005) reach a similar conclusion based on the expectations channel using a standard forward-looking New Keynesian model. At low interest rates, forward looking agents anticipate the possibility that future shocks might push the interest rate down to the ZLB. As a result, output and inflation are lowered today. To counteract this amplification mechanism, the central bank must therefore cut rates pre-emptively in order to raise expectations of future inflation and output.
Compatible with this analysis, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) find, using dynamic programming techniques, that the policy rate becomes increasingly sensitive to inflation as it falls and the likelihood that the ZLB will be reached rises. In their model, the central bank can use other policy instruments when the ZLB is reached, but not costlessly. Hence in non-deflationary times policymakers are willing to trade off some of their other objectives in order to lower the probability of reaching the ZLB.
A third option is for the central bank to behave more cautiously, cutting interest rates by less than the standard reaction function would recommend. In that case the interest rate will follow the dotted line in Figure 1 . By so doing, the central bank keeps some of its "ammunition" and hence retains the option of interest cuts at a later date. This view is sometimes expressed in policymaking circles (e.g., Bini Smaghi, 2008) . Its proponents argue that aggressive rate cuts may be taken as a sign that the central bank has a more pessimistic view of the economic outlook than market participants and hence induce a worsening of market sentiment. In addition, transmission mechanisms may become much weaker nearer the lower bound, rendering monetary loosening less effective. Finally, keeping rates low for a sustained period of time can fuel future imbalances which are painful to unwind in the tightening phase.
Each of these has a distinct implication for interest rate setting. Under the first strategy, the central bank will set i = i* until the ZLB is reached. Under the second strategy, i will fall below i* as the likelihood that the ZLB will be reached rises.
Finally, under the third strategy, i will rise above i* as the likelihood increases. This suggests that it is possible to discriminate between these approaches by comparing i and i* as i* falls towards zero. Of course, doing so is complicated by the fact that we do not observe i* directly. However, if we can estimate a model for i*, we can study the relationship between and i and our estimate of i* as the likelihood that the ZLB will be reached increases. Thus, it is principle possible to test whether central banks behaved as suggested by the literature on optimal monetary policy at the ZLB.
This approach requires us to develop a model for i. We do by estimating a reaction function and therefore next review the literature estimating reaction functions for the ECB.
Empirical reaction functions for the ECB
There exists a substantial literature estimating reaction functions for the ECB. Most studies estimate reaction functions on a monthly basis, since this is the frequency with which the ECB's Governing Council meets to set rates. However, the frequency chosen has consequences for the data which are used. Whilst inflation is available at a monthly frequency, data for GDP are only available quarterly. For this reason some studies use data for industrial production, which is available monthly.
Alternatively, one can use subjective measures of real economic conditions, which also are available on a monthly basis. As noted by Gerlach (2007) , the latter accords with the ECB's own statements which typically stress the importance of "economic sentiment" or "business confidence" rather than output gaps. One reason we prefer to use monthly data is it allows us to identify the timing and speed of the switch of any change in the reaction function with much greater precision than quarterly data would.
The early literature typically focussed on comparing ECB rate-setting behaviour after EMU with that of national central banks in the run-up to EMU, on estimated single reaction function or the two periods. 7 Several of these papers found that the reaction to inflation was below unity, implying that real interest rates fell in response to rising inflation. Later work has tended to overturn this result or provide resolutions to the puzzle.
One strand of literature uses ordered probit techniques to estimate the factors determining whether the ECB raises, lowers or leaves unchanged the repo rate.
Several papers in this strand found a strong role for monetary variables consistent with the ECB's second pillar. Carstensen (2003) argues that a monetary overhangbut not money growth -has an important role to play; Gerlach (2007) however, does detect a significant influence of monetary growth. In addition, he finds responses to the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate but not to inflation, which he attributes to the fact that headline inflation was close to the desired level in the sample period studied.
Several later papers have argued that the fit of the model and the plausibility of coefficient estimates can be enhanced by using real time data or real time forecasts (Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2004; Sauer and Sturm, 2007; Gorter et al., 2008) .
In common with other strands of the literature these papers find a reaction to both inflation and measures of economic activity. In terms of statistical significance, the latter responses are particularly strong. Given that the ECB's main goal is price stability, this suggests that the ECB reacts to economic activity as an indicator of future inflationary pressure. Gerlach-Kristen (2003) finds a role for the long interest rate, which she interprets as a proxy for longer run inflation expectations, in the 7
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reaction function. The fact that it is significant is consistent with the ECB's frequent stress on the need to anchor inflation expectations.
On the question of whether and how the ECB's reaction function has changed since the current financial crisis the empirical literature is rather scarce. To our knowledge the only existing work is de Haan et al. (2009) . They compare reaction functions estimated prior to the crisis with those estimated over a full sample. They find that adding crisis observations to the sample increases the estimated coefficient on inflation.
ECB interest rate decisions, 2007-2009
The ECB main policy instrument is the repo rate, which is shown in Figure For example, on 11 September 2007, President Trichet told the European Parliament: "I would like to emphasize that our primary mandate calls for our monetary policy stance to deliver price stability in the medium term. Once the level of interest rates is decided we have the responsibility to ensure the smooth functioning of the segment of the money market that we influence. The two responsibilities are clearly separated and should not be mixed."
In terms of strategy, the ECB has during the crisis laid particular focus on the medium-term inflation outlook as a guide for policymaking. 10 In addition, it has spoken of a "broad-based" approach, which looks beyond a narrow set of indicators to consider all potential risks to price stability. Both these elements of the framework would seem to permit the altering of monetary policy stance to take into account the challenges posed by the ZLB.
That said, up to now the ECB has refrained from directly discussing the ZLB problem or the appropriate response to it in its official publications. spoken of the need to cut cautiously in order to preserve the option of future cuts;
whereas Orphanides (2008) , consistent with the academic work, including his own, has been supportive of a more aggressive response to the economic downturn in the face of the ZLB.
Taken together, this narrative evidence is thus rather agnostic on the question of whether and how the ZLB has affected ECB monetary policymaking. That suggests that empirical analysis might be of particular help in understanding how the ECB has set interest rates during the current financial crisis and whether the possibility that the desired level of the repo rate might become negative has influenced its policy decisions.
The Model
In this section we discuss the empirical approach. The underlying idea is simple. We estimate a reaction function for the ECB that is allowed to change during the estimation period. We then use the estimated parameters for the period before the crisis and macroeconomic data from the crisis to compute an estimate of i* and compare that to the actual time path of overnight rates. This approach also yields estimates of the reaction function during the crisis and the time and speed of the switch.
Interest Rate Setting
The starting point for the econometric analysis is a version of the model proposed by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) to study interest rate setting by the Federal Reserve. Let
Let t π , t y , t µ and t ε denote inflation, real economic activity, money growth and the rate of appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate. 12 The target level for the interest rate is given by:
(1)
α are expected to be positive and ε α negative. Next, the overnight rate is allowed to move gradually towards the target:
(2)
where t e is a residual. Using equations (1) and (2) we have that:
(3)
. Before proceeding, we rewrite equation (3) as:
where Θ is a row vector of parameters and t Z a column vector containing the regressors.
To proceed, one may think of the fitted value equation (4) as a measure of i*.
However, in estimating this equation, one must take into account the fact that the central bank may have deviated from i* during the sample period because it is concerned that the policy rate may reach the ZLB in the future. To avoid that problem, we estimation the reaction function but allow the parameters in Θ to change.
Modelling Structural Change
To model structural change, we assume that there are two reaction functions, one in force before, and the other during the financial crisis. During the transition the central bank follows a weighted average of the two with the weights evolving over time in a way we estimate below. Using obvious notation we have that:
(5a) we reject the hypothesis of parameter constancy, we can then estimate a reaction function for the two subsamples. One unattractive aspect of the first approach is that the date of switch is imposed by the modeller, rather than being estimated. A shortfall common to both approaches is that the break is assumed to be instantaneous. This therefore precludes the possibility that the switch from one regime to another occurred smoothly.
logistic switching model which produces estimates of both the point in time and the speed at which the transition occurred. 13 Thus, we assume that the full model can be written as:
where the variance of the errors is given by However, estimating a such a model requires that one observes switches from regime I to regime II and back again. Given the short sample of our data, it is difficult to believe that there was a switch back to the pre-crisis regime within the span of our dataset.
time between one quarter and three quarters of the adjustment has occurred is given by log(9)/κ. Third, this specification nests the case of a discrete break: as κ tends to infinity, the speed of adjustment tends also to infinity.
Before proceeding, note that as the model now stands, there is a lack of identification. the data equally well. When estimating the model, we therefore impose the requirement that κ > 0. 14 This imposes no restrictions on the data.
Data
The review of the literature on estimating reaction functions for the ECB indicated that inflation, money growth, the rate of depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate and measures of real economic activity are all potential regressors. For inflation, we use the annual percentage change in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). For money growth, we take the annualised growth rate of M3, and for the nominal exchange rate take the change in the nominal effective exchange rate index over the previous twelve months. The source for all three variables is the ECB's website.
To measure economic activity we use the Purchasing Manager's Index (PMI) produced by Markit. Although the empirical literature frequently utilises output gaps in empirical reaction functions, the ECB's monthly bulletin rarely refers to these and instead lays much greater stress on indicators of economic sentiment as 14 We do so by assuming that κ = exp(K) and estimate K. One additional reason for doing that is that below we calculate empirical confidence bands for the transition function using Monte Carlo simulation. When drawing from estimated distribution for the speed parameter, we must ensure that all draws have the same (positive) sign.
discussed by Gerlach (2007) . Figure 3 plots the euro area PMI together with real GDP growth over four quarters and shows that the two series are strongly correlated. One important difference, however, is that real GDP growth has recovered much more slowly following the onset of the crisis.
While the two series thus contain similar information, using the PMI in reaction functions for the ECB has three important advantages over real GDP growth. First, it is available monthly; real GDP data are only available on a quarterly basis. Second, it is released in the beginning of each month for the previous month. Thus, the reporting lag is minimal in contrast to real GDP data, which are only available with a substantial lag. Third, revisions tend to be small and occur soon after the release of the data; the national accounts data are typically revised several times. These reasons suggest that the PMI is likely to be more strongly correlated with the ECB's view of real economic activity than real GDP, and therefore more suitable for inclusion in the reaction function.
For inflation and the M3, each issue of the monthly bulletin reports provisional data for the previous month, and thus the definitive data are only available with a two month lag. Data more than 2 months old are subject to negligible revisions. 15 Exchange rate data are available with a month's lag, and are not subsequently revised. Accordingly, we lag inflation and M3 growth by two months and the PMI and the exchange rate by one month.
Estimation
One important feature of the logistic switching model presented above is that the variance of the errors evolves over time in the same way as the parameters. Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) propose to estimate the model using maximum likelihood, but in fact use a grid search procedure to determine the parameters in the logistic switching function. Here instead we estimate the full model with maximum likelihood.
As starting values, we use the coefficient estimates obtained from estimating the reaction function with OLS.
Model estimates: Regime switch as a function of time
The model estimates are presented in Table 1 . The columns headed "pre-crisis"
show the reaction coefficients in the first period, Θ1. The columns headed "crisis"
show the coefficients in the second period, Θ2. Standard errors and p-values are reported under each coefficient.
We began by estimating an unrestricted model which included the lagged interest rate, the lagged change in the interest rate, HICP inflation, the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for the euro area, M3 growth, and the rate of appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro area enter. 16 Since this function is likely to be heavily overfitted, in particular in the crisis period, we do not comment on it in detail. That said, the coefficients all have the expected signs in the pre-crisis period, but the parameters on inflation and money growth are insignificant. Overall, the equations suggest that monetary policy was tightened in response to higher inflation, However, given the wide standard errors in the unrestricted model, it is possible that quite a range of alternative restrictions could also be accepted. For that reason, we also estimated an alternative where all coefficients bar that on the lagged interest rate were equal to the first period values (see appendix, Table A1 for details). However, the value of likelihood function then falls and the posterior odds ratio of such an alternative model is 0.013. That means that the model with the zero reactions is around 60 times more likely to be the correct one than the one with no change in reactions. We view this as evidence in favour of the first model.
Given the debate about the importance of the monetary pillar of ECB's strategy, we also estimated variants of the reaction function which replace inflation with money growth, and which include both inflation and money growth (see appendix for results). These yielded very similar reaction coefficients and estimates of the switch date and speed, suggesting that our headline results are robust to the inclusion of money. However, posterior odds ratio tests suggested using inflation rather than money growth, and hence we omit this variable from our preferred specification.
Our preferred specification is presented on the right hand side of Table 1 . In the precrisis period, the results are as follows. The lagged interest rate is significant with a coefficient of 0.979 which indicates quite a high degree of gradualism in rate setting behaviour. The lagged change in the interest rate is also significant, with a negative sign which is consistent with the finding of Gerlach (2007): ceteris paribus, the ECB is less likely to cut (raise) rates if it did so in the previous month. The coefficient on inflation is positive and strongly significant. 18 The PMI also enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient, which is consistent with the findings elsewhere in the literature that the ECB pays considerable attention to measures of capacity utilisation as predictors of future inflation. Lastly, there is a significant response to the change in the nominal exchange rate, suggesting the ECB reacts to inflationary pressures generated via the exchange rate channel.
The switching date is estimated to have occurred at a trend value of 225.6 (the trend takes the value 225 in October and 226 in November 2008) and the speed parameter implies that the middle 75% of the transition took four months. Since the weight attached to the two regimes is a non-linear transformation of κ and λ, it is not easy to see directly how uncertainty about these parameters translates in uncertainty about the weight function. To explore this issue, we compute a confidence band for ω using simulations. To do so, we take 10,000 draws from the joint distribution of λ and κ and compute the weights implied by each pair. Figure 5 shows the median of the distribution together with a 95% confidence band and indicates that the transition took place in the aftermath of the collapse in Lehman Brothers, that is, more than a year after the turbulence in the interbank market in August 2007 which constituted the first sign of the crisis.
To further explore how plausible our estimates for the smooth transition model are, we also estimated two alternative versions. The first of these is a single regime model (which thus assumes that t ω = 0), and the second model allows for a discrete break in
October 2008 (so that ∞ → κ ). In both cases, likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the restrictions implied (see appendix A2 for details). These results imply that there was a structural break and that it was gradual.
One feature of our preferred model is that in the second, "crisis", regime the interest rate depends solely on its lagged value, a constant and the shock, that is, a first-order auto-regressive model. The fact that the interest rate fluctuates is not surprising since we use a market rate.
The coefficient estimates point to a clear change in the ECB's reaction to economic variables, but they do not tell us directly by how much the interest rate implied by the two reaction functions differs. To better understand the magnitude of the difference in interest rates between regimes, we compare dynamic forecasts from our smooth transition model, with those obtained from a single regime model.
We obtain these forecasts using simulation methods. We draw 10,000 realisations of the estimated parameters and use these to make dynamic forecasts of the path of the interest rate. 19 The point forecast is obtained by taking median value for the interest rate, and a 95% confidence interval around this is obtained by dropping the upper and lower 2.5% of realisations. The results for our preferred specification are shown in Figure We emphasise that in constructing these forecasts, we assume that the reaction function for the pre-crisis period is valid also for values of the regressors that are quite different from those that prevailed in the estimation period. Whilst these forecasts imply a lowering of interest rates in response to worsening macroeconomic conditions, the predicted fall in interest rates is much more gradual and the vertical difference between the forecast and actual interest rate is substantial. 
Model estimates: Regime switch as a function of real GDP growth
So far we have assumed that the weights attached to the reaction functions in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods evolve as a function of time. While our estimates indicate when and how fast the change occurred, they provide no explanation for why the change occurred. As noted earlier, it appears eminently plausible that the shift in the reaction function was triggered by the sharp weakening of the real economy following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Therefore, we now refine the model by making the switch a function of economic activity rather than time. One candidate measure of economic activity is the PMI but, as already discussed, it recovered very rapidly after the crisis while the ECB maintained interest rates at a low level. We therefore instead use GDP growth over twelve months as proxy for whatever considerations may have led the ECB to worry about the risk that the ZLB would be reached. 21 Denoting real GDP growth with g our weighting function becomes:
where g denotes the switching point.
The resulting estimates are shown in Table 2 . We began with an unrestricted model.
As before, this is likely to be heavily overfitted, so we do not comment in detail on its results. For the pre-crisis period, the reaction coefficients are very similar to those presented in the models in Table 1 . Moreover, the post-crisis reaction to all variables (bar the lagged interest rate), is highly insignificant. That again argues in favour of a similar restricted form to that presented in Table 1 .
The restriction that the second period reaction to all variables bar the lagged interest is zero is comfortably accepted. Therefore we once again model interest rate setting in the second period as a function of a constant and the lagged rate. The coefficients of both are very close to those in our restricted model in Table 1 . The switching point is estimated to have occurred at an annual growth rate of real GDP of -1.4%.
In the pre-crisis period, the responses of the interest rate to economic variables are also similar to those estimated earlier: there is a significant positive reaction to the PMI, and a strong positive reaction to inflation. Policy also appears to tighten when the nominal exchange rate depreciates.
The implied dynamics of the switch are best seen by graphing the implied transition function over time, along with a confidence band which we compute in the same way as earlier. As Figure 7 shows, the timing and speed of the switch look similar to those estimated when the switch is a function of time, but are naturally somewhat less precise since the shift must now match the behaviour of real GDP growth. Importantly, the estimates suggest a rapid, but not instant, shift in the autumn of
2008.
Dynamic forecasts of the interest rate assuming a shift in the reaction function are provided in Figure 9 , and assuming no shift in Figure 10 . These bands are slightly wider than those reported in Figures 5 and 6 , but otherwise tell a very similar storyi.e. that the actual rate lies well outside the 95% confidence interval of the single regime model, but matches up closely with the median forecast of the smooth transition model.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the ECB's interest rate setting behaviour during the financial turmoil of 2007-2009. We draw several conclusions.
The estimates indicate that following the rapid worsening of real economic activity in the fall of 2008, a reaction function that captures the ECB's interest rate setting before the crisis erupted starts to overpredict the overnight rate considerably. By contrast, a model that allows the reaction function to shift provides quite accurate dynamic forecasts of the interest rate. Using GDP growth rather than time as a variable to explain the switch produced similar results on the timing, speed and nature of the regime switch.
These findings are compatible with the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in the presence of the ZLB, which suggests that the central bank should cut more aggressively than its regular reaction function would suggest if it can foresee the ZLB binding in the future. Equally, they clearly reject the hypothesis that rate cutting has been more cautious in the vicinity of the zero bound. That said, these results could also have been generated by a stable but non-linear reaction function. 
